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All Journal Melintas An International Journal of Philosophy and Religion
Yulius Tandyanto
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Religion Arts Humanities Languange, Linguistic, Communication & Media Social Sciences

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Jean-Luc Marion: Pengantar atas ‘Keterberian’ dan ‘Fenomen yang Melimpah’ Tandyanto, Yulius
MELINTAS An International Journal of Philosophy and Religion (MIJPR) Vol. 30 No. 2 (2014)
Publisher : Faculty of Philosophy, Parahyangan Catholic University, Bandung

Show Abstract | Download Original | Original Source | Check in Google Scholar | Full PDF (378.349 KB) | DOI: 10.26593/mel.v30i2.1288.169-191

Abstract

For some contemporary thinkers, traditional and modern metaphysical systems were not considered as an adequate account, for they might have abolished the ontological difference. Such circumstances might have taken place because metaphysics was thought of as circumscribing by considering the whatness of any phenomena in form of, or oder of, the same, i.e. substance, essence or first cause. Jean-Luc Marion moves further and suggests phenomenological accounts that culminate in the givenness and the saturated phenomenon – ideas which open the possibilites to overcome the inadequacy of metaphysics. With the phenomenological third reduction, Marion shows that givenness already presents itself which is anterior to the dichotomy between essence and existence. This phenomenology of givenness enables phenomena to appear by itself in the saturated phenomena. In a paradoxical way, he shows that the constituting subject had already been constituted. Phenomenology, therefore, allows the subject to describe any phenomena in the form of, or order of, the other such as Marion proposed. Considering the contexts, this article may serve as an introduction to the notion of givenness and the saturated phenomenon.
Membaca 'Kebenaran' Nietzsche Tandyanto, Yulius
MELINTAS An International Journal of Philosophy and Religion (MIJPR) Vol. 31 No. 2 (2015)
Publisher : Faculty of Philosophy, Parahyangan Catholic University, Bandung

Show Abstract | Download Original | Original Source | Check in Google Scholar | Full PDF (315.099 KB) | DOI: 10.26593/mel.v31i2.1622.130-153

Abstract

Nietzsche’s early work that gives wide exploration of the idea of truth is his unpublished essay entitled Wahrheit und Lüge in Ausermoralischen Sinne (1872). His controversial statement in this essay was “Truths are illusions”, opening many interpretations among scholars in understanding his position on truth. Sarah Kofman argues that it is useless to speak about truth in Nietzsche’s philosophy, for values are neither true nor false. Referring values to truth means forgetting to place oneself “beyond good and evil.” Unlike Kofman, Maudemarie Clark separates sharply Nietzsche’s critique of metaphysics and his denial of truth. Clark argues that Nietzsche rejects metaphysics and eventually overcomes it in his own work, but also that he ultimately affirms the existence of truths and therefore does not undermine his own theory when he claims truth for his own position. Clark’s strategy in defending her theses tries to explain that there is a turning (Kehre) in Nietzsche’s position. This article wants to offer an interpretation that Nietzsche does not make a new theory of truth in WL, but rather examines and constates truths that hold true. With his subtile and metaphoric style, Nietzsche might want to vivify the symbolic and figurative elements in language before the truth or reality that already escapes languages.
Jean-Luc Marion: Pengantar atas ‘Keterberian’ dan ‘Fenomen yang Melimpah’ Tandyanto, Yulius
MELINTAS An International Journal of Philosophy and Religion (MIJPR) Vol. 30 No. 2 (2014)
Publisher : Faculty of Philosophy, Parahyangan Catholic University, Bandung

Show Abstract | Download Original | Original Source | Check in Google Scholar | DOI: 10.26593/mel.v30i2.1288.169-191

Abstract

For some contemporary thinkers, traditional and modern metaphysical systems were not considered as an adequate account, for they might have abolished the ontological difference. Such circumstances might have taken place because metaphysics was thought of as circumscribing by considering the whatness of any phenomena in form of, or oder of, the same, i.e. substance, essence or first cause. Jean-Luc Marion moves further and suggests phenomenological accounts that culminate in the givenness and the saturated phenomenon – ideas which open the possibilites to overcome the inadequacy of metaphysics. With the phenomenological third reduction, Marion shows that givenness already presents itself which is anterior to the dichotomy between essence and existence. This phenomenology of givenness enables phenomena to appear by itself in the saturated phenomena. In a paradoxical way, he shows that the constituting subject had already been constituted. Phenomenology, therefore, allows the subject to describe any phenomena in the form of, or order of, the other such as Marion proposed. Considering the contexts, this article may serve as an introduction to the notion of givenness and the saturated phenomenon.
Membaca 'Kebenaran' Nietzsche Tandyanto, Yulius
MELINTAS An International Journal of Philosophy and Religion (MIJPR) Vol. 31 No. 2 (2015)
Publisher : Faculty of Philosophy, Parahyangan Catholic University, Bandung

Show Abstract | Download Original | Original Source | Check in Google Scholar | DOI: 10.26593/mel.v31i2.1622.130-153

Abstract

Nietzsche’s early work that gives wide exploration of the idea of truth is his unpublished essay entitled Wahrheit und Lüge in Ausermoralischen Sinne (1872). His controversial statement in this essay was “Truths are illusions”, opening many interpretations among scholars in understanding his position on truth. Sarah Kofman argues that it is useless to speak about truth in Nietzsche’s philosophy, for values are neither true nor false. Referring values to truth means forgetting to place oneself “beyond good and evil.” Unlike Kofman, Maudemarie Clark separates sharply Nietzsche’s critique of metaphysics and his denial of truth. Clark argues that Nietzsche rejects metaphysics and eventually overcomes it in his own work, but also that he ultimately affirms the existence of truths and therefore does not undermine his own theory when he claims truth for his own position. Clark’s strategy in defending her theses tries to explain that there is a turning (Kehre) in Nietzsche’s position. This article wants to offer an interpretation that Nietzsche does not make a new theory of truth in WL, but rather examines and constates truths that hold true. With his subtile and metaphoric style, Nietzsche might want to vivify the symbolic and figurative elements in language before the truth or reality that already escapes languages.
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