Isenyo Solomon Ogaba
Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Humanities, Management and Social Sciences. Federal University Wukari, Taraba State, Nigeria

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Wittgenstein: Epistemology and Culture Isenyo Solomon Ogaba
PINISI Discretion Review Volume 3, Issue 2, March 2020
Publisher : Universitas Negeri Makassar

Show Abstract | Download Original | Original Source | Check in Google Scholar | DOI: 10.26858/pdr.v1i1.20163

Abstract

This work assumes that cultures are autonomous and complete within themselves. A particular system is not subject to criticism from the outside. Different cultures have their own systems which are independent of one another. Yet, all these systems and practices are called cultures by virtue of their family resemblance. Different cultures are in contact with one another, and they have to communicate with each other by using their own language-games and systems. When they are in contact with one another they have to reconcile this gap in their communication. Sometimes this can lead to problems in understanding each other. So, in this work, I attempted to make an assessment of these relationships between different cultures and try to give answers to the questions concerning these problems. To do this I gave an interpretation of Wittgenstein's writings on knowledge, most of which can be found in On Certainty.The paper concluded that the nature of the cultural relationships regarding  knowledge and belief, and what we can find out from Wittgenstein's ideas on the relationship between different epistemic beliefs,is that they are unique in their own rights,and best understood from their specific cultural epistemic foundations.
Tribal Epistemology Isenyo Solomon Ogaba
PINISI Discretion Review Volume 2, Issue 2, March 2019
Publisher : Universitas Negeri Makassar

Show Abstract | Download Original | Original Source | Check in Google Scholar | DOI: 10.26858/pdr.v3i2.20055

Abstract

The significance of Epistemology (theory of knowledge) is well known in philosophy. Hardly do we find a philosophical system without epistemology. Almost every major philosophical system has its distinct epistemological and metaphysical theses. Accordingly, if tribal philosophy is to be counted as a major system of philosophy, it is more likely that it has its distinct epistemological and metaphysical theses. In other words, if we can have a tribal epistemology distinguished from the other epistemological systems, then, we can expect to have a tribal philosophical system distinguished from other philosophical systems. To aim at the construction of a new epistemology and new philosophy, namely, tribal epistemology is very ambitious. It demands path-breaking inquiries into both epistemology and tribal culture such that a new epistemology and, along with it, a new system of philosophy can be established. I do not claim of making any such path-breaking inquiries in this work. However, I attempt to defend the idea that there can be a tribal epistemology distinct from other epistemological systems and, hence, do defend the idea of a philosophical system that can be called a tribal system of philosophy or “tribal philosophy”. Neither tribal epistemology nor tribal philosophy has been established as a major area of investigation in philosophy. In this work, I defended the very idea of a tribal epistemology with the objective that further philosophical investigations into the tribal knowledge systems can be fruitfully carried out on a plausible strong theoretical ground.
THE LOGIC OF COSMOPOLITANISM AND THE IDEA OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE Isenyo Solomon Ogaba
PREDESTINATION: Journal of Society and Culture Vol 1, No 2 (2021): Maret
Publisher : Universitas Negeri Makassar

Show Abstract | Download Original | Original Source | Check in Google Scholar | DOI: 10.26858/prd.v1i2.20165

Abstract

Cosmopolitanism considers the citizens of states as citizens of the world. In this way, cosmopolitanism transcends the idea of the state. The question then is, can cosmopolitanism offer a conceptual grid from where to begin to theorize the possibility of principles of international justice? Does cosmopolitanism carry a credible understanding of the relationship between the self and the other which could inform a viable and valid conception of justice for states? Does the cosmopolitan perspective contain the basis for international justice? In a world constitutive of cosmopolitan individual citizens, what constitutes and represents our agency, choice and consensus? Which of us would be responsible for working out the appropriate understanding of justice and its applicability? By merely labelling all individuals as citizens of the world, it does not offer an adequate or compelling account of the mechanisms of enforceability? And finally, and perhaps most importantly, who is the other in a cosmopolitan world?  These and many more are questions in which this work tends to shed light on. This work points that, in a world divided by nation states, this seems somewhat impractical as well as undesirable. This work argues that cosmopolitan account does offer a convincing moral perspective, it fails almost entirely in offering a compelling political narrative.