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All Journal Konfrontasi: Jurnal Kultural, Ekonomi dan Perubahan Sosial
Qusthan Firdaus
University of Multimedia Nusantara, Serpong, Indonesia
Humanities Economics, Econometrics & Finance Social Sciences

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A Philosophical Reflection in Controlling the Property and Self-ownership Qusthan Firdaus
Konfrontasi: Jurnal Kultural, Ekonomi dan Perubahan Sosial Vol 6 No 2 (2019): Konfrontasi, July
Publisher : Budapest International Research and Critics University

Show Abstract | Download Original | Original Source | Check in Google Scholar | Full PDF (637.045 KB) | DOI: 10.33258/konfrontasi2.v8i2.9

Abstract

This study aims to describe the philosophical reflection in controlling property and self-ownership. A crucial point about the concept is whether or not the non-separation between the owner and what is owned is plausible. There are differences between the way we exercise our rights to property in things and to property in persons. For instance, if we have rights to do anything with our property in things, therefore we also have rights to do anything with our property in persons, provided that there is no violation on others' rights. The results shows that in contrast, we can morally destroy our property in things if we could achieve our ends by doing it. In short, although we have rights either to destroy property in things and property in persons, we are not prone to exercise such rights on our property in persons.
Against Self-ownership: A Philosophical Reflection Qusthan Firdaus
Konfrontasi: Jurnal Kultural, Ekonomi dan Perubahan Sosial Vol 6 No 1 (2019): Konfrontasi, January
Publisher : Budapest International Research and Critics University

Show Abstract | Download Original | Original Source | Check in Google Scholar | Full PDF (521.648 KB) | DOI: 10.33258/konfrontasi2.v8i1.10

Abstract

This paper argues that the libertarians simply cut off the contingency (between not-yet-persons and persons) into time-slice account. They do not want to deal with a problem such as: how could the structure of Self-Ownership (SO) embed in persons? Indeed, the libertarians arbitrarily ignore who the owner of not-yet-persons is if a child is not a person yet. On the other hand, if God confers people’s property in person, it consequently means that a believer of SO is supposed to also believe in God. Insofar as a believer of SO cannot explain what the source of SO is, he needs to rely on a Lockeian explanation where God confers human with a property in person. There are two general libertarian reasons for this. First of all, the libertarian notion of slavery, as Cohen encounters it. Secondly, as Narveson conceives, since each individual has separate life, therefore every interaction between individuals is supposed to be based on mutual benefits. Therefore, the more appropriate way to encounter the thesis of SO is by cutting the bridge between the notion of owning self and a matter of moral right. Instead of cutting the bridge, Cohen widens his rejection by proposing another institution. Nevertheless, Cohen does nothing to explain what the structure of the bridge consist in and what the foundation for such a bridge is.
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