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XIE Qingyang
Wuhan University

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Application of Designing Economic Mechanisms to Power Market - Part 1 Generation Side Power Market Design XIE Qingyang; ZHU Yonggang; YING Liming
Indonesian Journal of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science Vol 11, No 4: April 2013
Publisher : Institute of Advanced Engineering and Science

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Abstract

The paper studies on the core philosophy and algorithm of the designing economic mechanisms theory, a new algorithm of designing incentive compatible power market mechanisms is proposed, a generation side power market mechanism model which has features of inventive compatibility, informationally efficient and decentralized decision is constructed. The power market based on the designing economic mechanisms theory can lead to the Pareto Optimality of the resource allocation; meanwhile GENCOs are permitted to pursue profits maximization. The paper is in two parts. Part 1 focuses on the process of constructing a generation side power market competitive mechanism model based on the designing economic mechanisms theory. Part 2 presents the characteristic analysis of the generation side power market competitive mechanism. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.11591/telkomnika.v11i4.2369
Application of Designing Economic Mechanisms to Power Market - Part 2 Characteristic Analysis of Generation Side Power Market ZHU Yonggang; XIE Qingyang; YING Liming
Indonesian Journal of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science Vol 11, No 4: April 2013
Publisher : Institute of Advanced Engineering and Science

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Abstract

The incentive power market may lead to a high information cost if it is not informationally efficient. The paper analyzes the characteristic of the generation side power market mechanism model based on the designing economic mechanisms theory by the three GENCOs (Generation Companies) case. The result of analysis is that the mechanism model has four main features: the informationally efficient which means that the mechanism meets requirements of the observational efficiency, the communication efficiency and the low complexity of computing; the incentive compatibility which indicates that the resource allocation of the power market is Pareto Optimality and the social benefit achieves the maximization when GENCOs also achieve profit maximization; the decentralized decision which refers to preserving the privacy information of GENCOs; encouragement of competition which suggests that the mechanism encourages GENCOs to compete with each other healthily. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.11591/telkomnika.v11i4.2370
Co-Authors YING Liming YING Liming ZHU Yonggang