Bachtiar, Yanivi S.
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CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, INFORMATION ASYMMETRY, AND EARNINGS MANAGEMENT Siregar, Sylvia Veronica; Bachtiar, Yanivi S.
Jurnal Akuntansi dan Keuangan Indonesia Vol. 2, No. 1
Publisher : UI Scholars Hub

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Abstract

The purpose of this study is to investigate the relationship between corporate governance, information asymmetry, and earnings management. Prior research indicates that information asymmetry negatively correlated with earnings management (Richardson, 2001). As predicted, this study also found negative correlation between bid-ask spread, as a proxy of information asymmetry, and discretionary accruals, as a proxy of earnings management. In addition, we also test whether corporate governance mechanisms will impact the level of discretionary accruals and eventually affect firm value. We use several variables as proxies of corporate governance mechanisms such as institutional ownership, audit quality, independent board, and existence of audit committee. We found that audit committee has significant negative relation with discretionary accruals. This indicates that audit committee existence is effectively constraining the level of earnings management. This study also has that proportion of independent board and existence of audit committee increase the positive relationship between discretionary accruals and stock return. These indicates that earnings management conducted by firms having higher proportion of independent board and firms having audit committee will be valued higher by the market.
THE ROLE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN PREVENTING MISSTATED FINANCIAL STATEMENT Siregar, Sylvia Veronica; Bachtiar, Yanivi S.
Jurnal Akuntansi dan Keuangan Indonesia Vol. 2, No. 1
Publisher : UI Scholars Hub

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Abstract

The purpose o f our study is to empirically investigate the relation between certain corporate governance mechanisms and the likelihood o f a company having accounting problem, as evidenced by a misstatement o f its earnings. We use public listed firms in JSE as our sample, with total samples o f 160 firms-years. Our study finds that proportion o f independent board, proportion o f institutional ownership, and audit quality is significantly have negative relationship with the probability o f restatement. These results suggest that those governance mechanisms are able to prevent misstated financial misstatement. But, we find that three governance mechanisms - board size, existence o f audit committee, and block holders - do not have significant relationship with the probability o f restatement.