Article Per Year (5 Year)
p-Index From 2021 - 2026
0.444
P-Index
This Author published in this journals
All Journal Unnes Law Journal : Jurnal Hukum Universitas Negeri Semarang Jurnal HAM
Jamil Ddamulira Mujuzi
Faculty of Law, University of the Western Cape
Law, Crime, Criminology & Criminal Justice

Published : 2 Documents Claim Missing Document
Claim Missing Document
Check
Articles

Found 2 Documents
Search

 1 
The International Court of Justice’s Jurisdiction to Review Its Judgments: Understanding Article 61 of the ICJ Statute in Light of Its Drafting History Jamil Ddamulira Mujuzi
Unnes Law Journal Vol. 11 No. 2 (2025): October, 2025
Publisher : Universitas Negeri Semarang

Show Abstract | Download Original | Original Source | Check in Google Scholar | DOI: 10.15294/ulj.v11i2.37197

Abstract

Judgments of the ICJ are final and not subject to appeal. However, Article 61 of the ICJ Statute empowers the ICJ to review its judgments. The ICJ replaced the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ). Article 61 of the PCIJ Statute (1920) empowered the PCIL to review its decisions. When the PCIJ ceased to exist, Article 61 of its Statute was reproduced, almost verbatim, as Article 61 of the ICJ Statute. In this article, the author illustrates the drafting histories Articles 61 of the PCIJ (1920 – 1921) and ICJ (1945) respectively. The PCIJ did not invoke Article 61 of its Statute. The ICJ has so far invoked Article 61 in three judgments. It is illustrated that although the ICJ has not referred to the drafting history of Article 61 in its judgments, its interpretation of Article 61 is substantially consistent with its drafting history. The drafting history of Article 61 suggests that the first criterion that the Court is supposed to assess before deciding whether to exercise jurisdiction is whether the review application has been filed within the stipulated time. If the answer to this question is in the negative, the court should dismiss the application summarily and not discuss the other grounds of admissibility. However, practice from the Court shows that it has not followed this approach. It is also argued that the Court can invoke its inherent jurisdiction to extend the deadline for filing of review applications although the Statute and the Rules are silent on that issue.
Remisi hukuman dan konstitusionalitas hukuman penjara seumur hidup di Seychelles Jamil Ddamulira Mujuzi
Jurnal HAM Vol 15 No 1 (2024): Edisi April
Publisher : Badan Strategi Kebijakan Hukum

Show Abstract | Download Original | Original Source | Check in Google Scholar | DOI: 10.30641/ham.2024.15.63-84

Abstract

This article critically examines the legal framework surrounding life imprisonment in Seychelles, particularly in light of recent legislative and judicial developments. Historically, Seychelles' legal landscape allowed for the remittance of sentences for all prisoners except those serving life terms or convicted of severe drug offenses. Prior to 2021, ambiguity existed regarding whether life imprisonment necessitated incarceration for the entirety of an offender's life, leading to varied interpretations and inconsistent practices wherein some individuals were released after 15 to 20 years of imprisonment. This uncertainty was addressed by an important decision of the Seychelles Court of Appeal, which asserted that life imprisonment should indeed mean incarceration for the remainder of the convict's natural life. Subsequently, legislative amendments in 2021 codified this understanding within the Criminal Procedure Code, expressly defining life imprisonment as confinement for the duration of the offender's life. However, the article argues that such a statutory definition and practice may contravene fundamental human rights principles, particularly concerning human dignity and protection from inhuman or degrading treatment. Drawing on comparative jurisprudence from various African jurisdictions, decisions of the European Court of Human Rights, and standards articulated by international human rights bodies, the author contends that indefinite life imprisonment without the prospect of release violates prisoners' rights enshrined in international law. Furthermore, the author invokes the drafting history of Article 10(3) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), emphasizing that the intent behind the provision was to safeguard against overly punitive sentences that deny any possibility of rehabilitation or eventual release. This historical context, according to the article, supports the argument that Seychelles' current approach to life imprisonment undermines its obligations under international human rights norms. Moreover, the Constitution of Seychelles grants the President discretionary powers under Article 60 to commute sentences, theoretically enabling the release of individuals sentenced to life imprisonment. This aspect introduces a layer of executive discretion that intersects with constitutional principles and international human rights standards, warranting further examination and critique. In conclusion, the article posits that Seychelles' statutory definition of life imprisonment raises constitutional and human rights concerns, advocating for a reevaluation of current practices in light of international legal standards and principles of justice.
Co-Authors