<![CDATA[The president possesses the prerogative right to appoint and dismiss his government personnel without having to seek approval from other branches of power. In practice, the president often does not use the rightfully because of the coalition consequences of the multiparty party system, which also has implications for the practice of appointing ministers and deputy ministers. Therefore, the president is not independent to choose figures for strategic political positions. This study examined the Indonesian president's prerogative right in appointing ministers after the amendment to the 1945 Constitution. This study used doctrinal legal research with statutory regulations, conceptual approaches, and comparative approaches. This study concludes with two points. First, the presidential system is rigid compared to the more flexible parliamentary system. The presidential system also tends to be more prone to causing immobility and deadlock. A multiparty system has implications for inconsistency in governance with a presidential system of government. Second, the combination of a multiparty system has implications for the president's prerogative right not being used effectively. Thus, a reconstruction of the model of minister appointment is required. The appointment should no longer be the absolute authority of the president. The president must involve other institutions that represent the people as a form of checks and balances.DOI: https://doi.org/10.22304/pjih.v10n2.a6]]>
