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All Journal CAUCHY: Jurnal Matematika Murni dan Aplikasi JOIV : International Journal on Informatics Visualization Buletin Pos dan Telekomunikasi
Windarta, Susila
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Computer Science & IT Decision Sciences, Operations Research & Management Economics, Econometrics & Finance Engineering Industrial & Manufacturing Engineering Mathematics Social Sciences

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Practical Evaluation and Complexity Analysis of Forgery Attacks on the PAES-8 Authenticated Encryption Scheme Windarta, Susila; Purbasari, Imas
Buletin Pos dan Telekomunikasi Vol. 22 No. 2 (2024): December 2024
Publisher : Centre for Research and Development on Resources, Equipment, and Operations of Posts and I

Show Abstract | Download Original | Original Source | Check in Google Scholar | DOI: 10.17933/bpostel.v22i2.403

Abstract

The Parallelizable Authenticated Encryption Scheme (PAES)-8, designed by Ye et al. in 2014, claims to provide 128-bit authentication security in the nonce-misuse model. However, Sasaki and Wang's theoretical forgery attack on PAES-8 exposed vulnerabilities, suggesting a universal forgery with a complexity of approximately . This study presents a practical implementation of Sasaki and Wang’s theoretical forgery attack on the PAES-8 encryption scheme, uncovering significant modifications required for its execution. This including the use of DDT-based plaintext injection, staged state recovery, multiple injection attempts, and algorithmic adjustments. Our findings demonstrate that these modifications increase the attack complexity to approximately 211+212+27 = 212, indicating greater resistance in PAES-8 than previously anticipated. Future cryptanalysis should focus on exploring nonce-respecting models to evaluate the scheme’s security.
An Extended Cryptanalysis of Peyrin on SIMON-JAMBU64/96: A Study on Reduced-Tuple Attacks Windarta, Susila; Handayani, Wuri; Susanti, Bety Hayat
CAUCHY: Jurnal Matematika Murni dan Aplikasi Vol 10, No 2 (2025): CAUCHY: JURNAL MATEMATIKA MURNI DAN APLIKASI
Publisher : Mathematics Department, Universitas Islam Negeri Maulana Malik Ibrahim Malang

Show Abstract | Download Original | Original Source | Check in Google Scholar | DOI: 10.18860/cauchy.v10i2.36601

Abstract

This study evaluates and verifies the cryptanalysis of Peyrin \textit{et al.} on the SIMON-JAMBU64/96 Authenticated Encryption (AE) scheme, with the aim of extending the attack to a reduced number of tuples. We adopt both formal analysis and experimental validation, constructing collision-based distinguishers under a chosen-IV model and testing them with a decryption oracle. The main contribution is the demonstration that a distinguishing attack can be performed with just two tuples, showing that JAMBU is more vulnerable than previously assumed. We provide a detailed comparison of data complexity, where the two-tuple attack achieves a lower cost in the second phase ($4 \cdot 2^{48}$ queries) than the three-tuple attack ($6 \cdot 2^{48}$), at the expense of extra verification effort in the third phase. Overall, our results confirm that the SIMON-JAMBU64/96 scheme is susceptible to distinguishing, plaintext forgery, and plaintext-recovery attacks, thereby reaffirming and extending the findings of Peyrin \textit{et al.} to scenarios with more limited adversarial resources.
Enhancing Security in Cross-Border Payments: A Cyber Threat Modeling Approach Amiruddin, Amiruddin; Briliyant, Obrina Candra; Windarta, Susila; Setiadji, Muhammad Yusuf Bambang; Priambodo, Dimas Febriyan
JOIV : International Journal on Informatics Visualization Vol 9, No 6 (2025)
Publisher : Society of Visual Informatics

Show Abstract | Download Original | Original Source | Check in Google Scholar | DOI: 10.62527/joiv.9.6.3205

Abstract

Cross-border payment (CBP) systems are critical to the global economy but are increasingly susceptible to cyber threats due to their complex structures and diverse transaction models. This paper analyzes cyber vulnerabilities across four CBP models: correspondent banking (SWIFT), infrastructure (ApplePay), closed-loop (PayPal), and peer-to-peer (Ripple). It employs the STRIDE methodology and adapts the cyber threat modeling framework proposed by Khalil et al. Key objectives include identifying vulnerabilities, assessing the impact of threats, and proposing mitigation strategies. The corresponding banking model shows the highest threat impact due to extensive transaction elements crossing trust boundaries. In contrast, the closed-loop model demonstrates lower vulnerability because of fewer components outside its trust boundary. Peer-to-peer and infrastructure models present moderate risk levels influenced by blockchain transparency and infrastructure dependencies. Critical threats identified include abuse of authority, malware, and script injection, which can result in significant losses, such as financial theft, service outages, and data breaches. Results indicate that interactions between processes across trust boundaries exacerbate cyber risks. Strategic recommendations include reducing system complexity, reinforcing security protocols at trust boundaries, and integrating advanced threat detection mechanisms. The study highlights these vulnerabilities and risks and underscores the need for robust cybersecurity measures to protect CBP systems. This research contributes to the existing knowledge by providing a detailed threat assessment and practical insights for improving CBP security. Future studies should explore alternative modeling methods, update security contexts to reflect real-world scenarios, and analyze the impact of open banking technologies.
Co-Authors Amiruddin Amiruddin Briliyant, Obrina Candra Dimas Febriyan Priambodo Muhammad Yusuf Bambang Setiadji Purbasari, Imas Susanti, Bety Hayat Wuri Handayani