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Ketika Politik Menjadi Kartel : Praktik dan Penyebab Suburnya Kartelisasi di Indonesia Frederica, Wynne
Socio-political Communication and Policy Review Vol. 2 No. 4 (2025)
Publisher : Lenggogeni Data Publishing

Show Abstract | Download Original | Original Source | Check in Google Scholar | DOI: 10.61292/shkr.264

Abstract

This paper discusses the phenomenon of political cartels as a form of collusion between party elites in Indonesia's post-reform democratic system. Political cartels refer to strategic cooperation between major parties to maintain power and access state resources, which blurs the boundaries between rulers and opposition and weakens the representative function of parties. Using Katz and Mair's theoretical approach and a contextual analysis of national political practice, this paper explores how cartelization has become institutionalized in Indonesia's multiparty presidential system. Factors such as party dependence on state funding, weak party ideology, elitist electoral regulations, and the absence of a permanent opposition have reinforced this practice. Cartelization leads to a decline in the quality of democracy, weakened accountability and increased public apathy. This paper recommends party system reform, strengthening the opposition, transparency of political funds, and revitalizing the role of civil society as steps towards a more substantive and representative democracy. Abstrak Makalah ini membahas fenomena kartel politik sebagai bentuk kolusi antarelite partai dalam sistem demokrasi Indonesia pascareformasi. Kartel politik merujuk pada kerja sama strategis antarpartai besar untuk mempertahankan kekuasaan dan mengakses sumber daya negara, yang mengaburkan batas antara penguasa dan oposisi serta melemahkan fungsi representatif partai. Dengan menggunakan pendekatan teoritis dari Katz dan Mair serta analisis kontekstual terhadap praktik politik nasional, makalah ini mengurai bagaimana kartelisasi telah melembaga dalam sistem presidensial multipartai Indonesia. Faktor-faktor seperti ketergantungan partai terhadap dana negara, lemahnya ideologi partai, regulasi pemilu yang elitis, serta absennya oposisi permanen turut memperkuat praktik ini. Kartelisasi berdampak pada menurunnya kualitas demokrasi, melemahnya akuntabilitas, dan meningkatnya apatisme publik. Makalah ini merekomendasikan reformasi sistem kepartaian, penguatan oposisi, transparansi dana politik, serta revitalisasi peran masyarakat sipil sebagai langkah menuju demokrasi yang lebih substantif dan representatif. kata kunci: kartel politik, demokrasi elektoral, kolusi elite, koalisi partai
Political Economization vs Economic Politicization: A Comparative Study of Park Chung Hee's and Soeharto's Leadership in Promoting Economic Development Frederica, Wynne
Business and Investment Review Vol. 3 No. 4 (2025)
Publisher : CV. Lenggogeni Data Publishing

Show Abstract | Download Original | Original Source | Check in Google Scholar | DOI: 10.61292/birev.183

Abstract

This study aims to examine the differences in political-economic strategies between Park Chung Hee in South Korea and Soeharto in Indonesia, with a particular focus on how authoritarian leadership and discriminatory economic policies influenced the direction and outcomes of national development. It explores how Park’s approach, centered on economic discrimination, meritocratic industrial policies, and corporate-led growth fundamentally differed from Soeharto’s strategy, which relied heavily on political patronage and the politicization of economic policy. This research adopts a qualitative descriptive approach using library research methods, by reviewing relevant academic journals and scholarly publications. The analysis is conducted by interpreting key themes in each leader’s development policies, particularly concerning the role of the state in creating economic incentives and shaping institutional structures that either promoted or hindered economic growth. Economic development remains one of the most critical challenges in postcolonial developing countries. This study compares two authoritarian regimes Park Chung Hee’s South Korea and Soeharto’s Indonesia. Both of which adopted state-led development models in the postcolonial era. Although both leaders shared similar institutional frameworks, military backgrounds, and centralized governance, their economic outcomes diverged significantly. Park’s leadership exemplified the “economization of politics,” where state power was used to enforce meritocracy, promote industrial performance, and discipline markets. South Korea achieved robust export-led industrialization and institutionalized economic meritocracy through support for chaebols and long-term planning. In contrast, Soeharto’s regime reflected “economic politicization,” wherein state resources were distributed based on political loyalty rather than performance. This led to structural fragility, inequality, and eventual collapse during the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. Using a qualitative descriptive approach based on literature review, the study finds that authoritarian development success depends less on the degree of state control and more on the quality of governance, institutional discipline, and commitment to performance-based policies.