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F Fenomenologi Heidegger dan Epistemic Injustice: Kritik Terhadap Dominasi Artificial Inteligence dalam Struktur Pengetahuan Manusia: Heidegger's Phenomenology and Epistemic Injustice: A Critique of the Dominance of Artificial Intelligence in the Structure of Human Knowledge Mukmin, Muhammad Andry; Putri, L.G Saraswati
Jurnal Filsafat Indonesia Vol. 8 No. 3 (2025)
Publisher : Undiksha

Show Abstract | Download Original | Original Source | Check in Google Scholar | DOI: 10.23887/jfi.v8i3.92268

Abstract

This research examines how Artificial Intelligence influences the structure of human knowledge through the lens of Martin Heidegger’s phenomenology and Miranda Fricker’s theory of Epistemic Injustice. Artificial Intelligence is not merely a technological tool but a part of Gestell that limits the way humans understand reality. This framing contributes to epistemic injustice, particularly in the form of testimonial injustice, when human epistemic authority is replaced by Artificial Intelligence systems, and hermeneutical injustice, when the experiences of certain groups are excluded from knowledge structures due to algorithmic bias. This study emphasizes the need for reflective awareness, the development of transparent Artificial Intelligence regulations, and social participation in technological design to prevent the subordination of humans to knowledge systems framed by Artificial Intelligence.
Kemiskinan Trans-Gender: Kritik Materialis Atas Identitas, Tubuh dan Produksi Gender Dalam Kapitalisme Neoliberal: Transgender Poverty: A Materialist Critique of Identity, the Body, and the Production of Gender in Neoliberal Capitalism Mukmin, Muhammad Andry
Jurnal Filsafat Indonesia Vol. 8 No. 3 (2025)
Publisher : Undiksha

Show Abstract | Download Original | Original Source | Check in Google Scholar | DOI: 10.23887/jfi.v8i3.101989

Abstract

This study examines the discourse of transsexuality in contemporary biomedicine through the lens of dual reality and situated ontology. By positioning the trans body as a field of tension between biological facts and symbolic meanings, the article rejects both medical essentialism and extreme relativism that dominate gender discourse. The research employs a qualitative-philosophical method, using Nicholas Rescher’s aporetic framework as a reflective tool to process epistemic tensions among science, identity, and power. Within this framework, contradictions are not regarded as problems to be solved but as spaces for critical and ethical reflection. The analysis involves a critical reading of the works of Butler, Foucault, Beauvoir, Haraway, and Preciado, while proposing a reflective compromise that transcends the cis/trans and male/female binaries. The trans body is understood not merely as an effect of power but as a site of resistance and ethical responsibility toward the Other. This study asserts that the liberation of identity does not lie in affirming fixed categories but in openness to ambiguity, negotiation, and transformation as the very core of human existence.
Computational and Thought Language: Beyond The Searle—Dennet Paradigm Mukmin, Muhammad Andry; Putri, Luh Gede Saraswati; Manalu, Abby Gina Boang
Jurnal Filsafat "WISDOM" Vol 35, No 2 (2025): (Article in Press)
Publisher : Fakultas Filsafat, Universitas Gadjah Mada Yogyakarta

Show Abstract | Download Original | Original Source | Check in Google Scholar | DOI: 10.22146/jf.105975

Abstract

This study examines the ontological tension in the debate between John R. Searle and Daniel C. Dennett regarding the relationship between language and consciousness, and then proposes the model of Computational Language and Thought Language as a new analytical framework. Computational Language is understood as a syntactic, algorithm-based language without intentionality. Conversely,Thought Language is a conceptual-intentional expression rooted in phenomenological consciousness. Through a conceptual-critical analysis grounded in the hermeneutic-phenomenological tradition, the study demonstrates that artificial intelligence can only produce Computational Language, whereas Thought Language cannot be reduced to computational operations. Neurocognitive evidence, such as the activation of Broca’s area in syntactic processing, supports the description of Computational Language, while Thought Language remains positioned as an ontological construct beyond empirical verification. This model not only maps the epistemic limits of artificial intelligence but also opens new avenues for reflection in the philosophy of mind, language, and technology.