Sahabuddin, Andi Arfan
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The “Constitutional Interest” Paradigm vs. the “Constitutional Injury” Requirement in Judicial Review Requests Sahabuddin, Andi Arfan
Pena Justisia: Media Komunikasi dan Kajian Hukum Vol. 24 No. 1 (2025): Pena Justisia
Publisher : Faculty of Law, Universitas Pekalongan

Show Abstract | Download Original | Original Source | Check in Google Scholar | DOI: 10.31941/pj.v24i1.7124

Abstract

The conceptual debate regarding the legal standing of applicants in judicial review cases at the Constitutional Court arises from two different paradigms: the looser "constitutional interest" paradigm and the stricter "constitutional injury" requirement. This difference creates uncertainty in practice, particularly regarding who is entitled to file a judicial review request and how the Constitutional Court assesses the applicant's legal standing. The purpose of this study is to analyze these different paradigms, examine the consistency of their application in Constitutional Court decisions, and assess their implications for access to constitutional justice in Indonesia. The research method used is normative legal research with a statute and case approach. Data were obtained through a review of relevant laws, legal doctrine, and analysis of Constitutional Court decisions, then analyzed qualitatively to identify the Court's argumentation patterns. The results show that the Constitutional Court tends to use the "constitutional injury" paradigm as the primary standard in assessing an applicant's legal standing. However, in some cases, the Court also considers the "constitutional interest" paradigm when constitutional issues are deemed to concern the broader public interest. This creates inconsistencies in judicial practice and demonstrates the considerable scope for interpretation for constitutional judges. The distinction between the interest and injury paradigms reflects the tension between the principle of judicial prudence and the need to expand access to constitutional justice. Clarity of standards is needed by the Constitutional Court to avoid legal uncertainty and to ensure that citizens' constitutional rights are consistently protected.