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All Journal Jaqfi : Jurnal Aqidah dan Filsafat Islam Multikultura
Mukhlis, Meutia Irina
Universitas Indonesia
Religion Arts Humanities Education Languange, Linguistic, Communication & Media Library & Information Science Social Sciences

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EPISTEMOLOGI INTELIJEN DALAM NARASI NEGARA YANG BIAS TENTANG GERWANI DALAM G30S 1965 Firyasa, Nadilya Adhwari; Adian, Donny Gahral; Mukhlis, Meutia Irina
Multikultura Vol. 4, No. 3
Publisher : UI Scholars Hub

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Abstract

This study analyzed epistemic bias in the state’s narrative about Gerwani during the 1965 G30S event using the epistemology of intelligence approach. Through a qualitative philosophical method, this research evaluated the state’s processes of information acquisition, interpretation, and dissemination, focusing on the identification of political bias, gender bias, confirmation bias, framing effects, overconfidence bias, as well as the use of misinformation and disinformation. The findings revealed that the state’s narrative about Gerwani was systematically constructed to support the New Order regime’s political agenda through the manipulation of information. These biases led to dangerous epistemic failures and justified violence and the erasure of women’s historical roles. The study concluded that a Pancasila-based philosophy of intelligence, especially the epistemology of intelligence, was necessary to prevent future misuse of intelligence practices. It was recommended that state intelligence agencies prioritize truth, justice, and human rights principles to create an ethical and accountable intelligence system aligned with democratic values.
MEMPERTANYAKAN KEYAKINAN PADA KEMAMPUAN <i>ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE</i> KHUSUSNYA <i>STRONG AI</i>: SEBUAH PERSPEKTIF REALIS KRITIS Mukhlis, Meutia Irina
Multikultura Vol. 4, No. 4
Publisher : UI Scholars Hub

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Artificial intelligence (AI) is one of the most popular albeit divisive topics up for debate today. On the one hand, die-hard proponents of AI believe that AI may one day come close to possessing human-level intelligence or even supersedes it (this view of AI is called strong AI) while on the other, some seem unconvinced of the promises of strong AI and prefer to believe in a weaker form of AI, an AI that might be able to do some functions humans assign to them or simulate basic level of human intelligence. This paper leans more toward the latter’s view. Using critical realism and neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics as its theoretical framework and abduction as a method of reasoning and argumentation, this paper argues that belief in strong AI is misguided and caused by a flaw in the theoretical framework used to understand reality and the human condition, particularly in its ontological and ethical assumptions. On this view, the position of strong AI could not be upheld, since human intelligence is made up of different forms of intelligence including logical/rational, emotional and moral intelligence that could not all be neatly reduced and understood as a form of computation. Key words: Human Intelligence; Artificial Intelligence; Strong AI; Weak AI; Critical Realism; Neo-Aristotelian Virtue Ethics
Reciprocal Epistemic Failure in Ibn Ṭufayl's Ḥayy Ibn Yaqẓān: Extending Fricker's Hermeneutical Injustice to the Responsibility of the Knower Zalikho Su&#039;ada; Herdito Sandi Pratama; Meutia Irina Mukhlis
Jaqfi: Jurnal Aqidah dan Filsafat Islam Vol. 11 No. 1 (2026): Jaqfi: Jurnal Aqidah dan Filsafat Islam
Publisher : Jurusan Aqidah dan Filsafat Islam Universitas Negri Sunan Gunung Djati Bandung

Show Abstract | Download Original | Original Source | Check in Google Scholar | DOI: 10.15575/jaqfi.v11i1.46389

Abstract

The epilogue of Ibn Ṭufayl's Ḥayy Ibn Yaqẓān has recently been read as a portrait of epistemic injustice, with Ḥayy cast as the victim of a society that rejects his testimony on account of his foreignness. This article argues that the reading is untenable and that its correction yields a more interesting result. The narrative does not show Ḥayy being rejected: he is brought to the island by a respected figure, received with honour, and heard attentively; what defeats him is not prejudice against his identity but the incapacity of his audience — and, decisively, it is Ḥayy himself who withdraws, apologises to the people of Salāmān, counsels them to hold fast to the literal Law, and returns to his island. The tale is therefore not a critique of epistemic exclusion but an endorsement of it, and it belongs to the tradition of epistemic elitism running from al-Fārābī through Ibn Bājja to Ibn Rushd. Applying Miranda Fricker's categories, the article shows that Ḥayy's case satisfies none of the conditions for systematic testimonial injustice, since he belongs to no stereotyped social type, and that the hermeneutical lacuna in the story lies with the community rather than with him. Rather than abandoning Fricker, the article proposes an extension: what the tale exhibits is reciprocal epistemic failure — a community deprived of the interpretive resources by which the philosopher's testimony could be received, and a philosopher who declines the responsibility of supplying them. Drawing on Medina and Pohlhaus, the article argues that Fricker's framework, which analyses the victim, requires supplementation by an account of the epistemic responsibility of the privileged knower. Ibn Ṭufayl, read against himself, supplies the case that demands it.
Co-Authors Donny Gahral Adian Firyasa, Nadilya Adhwari Pratama, Herdito Sandi Zalikho Su&#039;ada