Modeling of Critical Threshold of Preference for Collusion (C.T.P.C.) and Cost Structure in Tunisian Mobile Market

Sami Debbichi (University ofTunis el Manar, Farhat Hached, Rommana, 1068, Tunisia)
Walid Hichri (University of Lyon, 92 Rue Pasteur, 69007 Lyon, France)

Quantitative Economics and Management Studies
Vol. 5 No. 1 (2024)

We present in this paper a modeling of the critical threshold of preference for collusion (C.T.P.C.) in different market structure using the interconnection fees and their marginal cost, in a Cournot competition. The objective is to compare the preference for collusion regarding this threshold in market structures and within two contexts: linear interconnection costs and quadratic ones. Collusion is more difficult in private duopoly that in a mixed one. This difficulty is increased with linear cost structure than quadratic costs. The findings we obtain from the application of our results to the Tunisian mobile market between (2002-2019) are consistent with our theoretical model.