Sami Debbichi
University ofTunis el Manar, Farhat Hached, Rommana, 1068, Tunisia

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Modeling of Critical Threshold of Preference for Collusion (C.T.P.C.) and Cost Structure in Tunisian Mobile Market Sami Debbichi; Walid Hichri
Quantitative Economics and Management Studies Vol. 5 No. 1 (2024)
Publisher : PT Mattawang Mediatama Solution

Show Abstract | Download Original | Original Source | Check in Google Scholar | DOI: 10.35877/454RI.qems2259

Abstract

We present in this paper a modeling of the critical threshold of preference for collusion (C.T.P.C.) in different market structure using the interconnection fees and their marginal cost, in a Cournot competition. The objective is to compare the preference for collusion regarding this threshold in market structures and within two contexts: linear interconnection costs and quadratic ones. Collusion is more difficult in private duopoly that in a mixed one. This difficulty is increased with linear cost structure than quadratic costs. The findings we obtain from the application of our results to the Tunisian mobile market between (2002-2019) are consistent with our theoretical model.