<![CDATA[The circuit netlist, logic locking mode, is an obfuscation method used to protect outsourced chip designs. Logic locking has been demonstrated to be broken via Boolean Satisfiability-based attacks, which has spurred researchers to create more robust defenses. The development of SAT attack marked a turning point in research on logic locking. Software systems frequently update their huge executable code, so obfuscating the program for each small update results in a significant loss of efficiency. In order to provide security guarantees against synthesis-driven assaults, this study provides a transformation strategy. Its Random Technique introduces a novel fault injection attack to undermine any locking mechanism that depends on a saved private key. This made it possible to compare the obfuscated circuit to its source, to determine whether a sufficient structural change has been made to support its functionality. The RT created an attack strategy to discover the value of the private key, K*. It examines the SFLL's security and offered a solution to determine the hamming distance, "h," using one or more SAT queries. It proposes an effective bit-flipping attack using the irregularity between the protected input patterns and the private key. By flipping bits, the attack cracks the private key, K*, with (n-1) queries. The outcome demonstrates that, given a protected input pattern, the right key may be quickly discovered by bit-flipping.]]>
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