Journal of Fiqh and Usul
سال. Û´Û¸, شماره. Û±: شماره پیاپی Û±Ã

A comparative study of the primary rule for doubt from the viewpoint of Mohaghegh Nāīnī and Shahīd Sadr

علی محمدی, طاهر ( دانشگاه ایلام)
زرگوش نسب, عبدالجبار ( دانشگاه ایلام)
نظرپور, حمزه ( دانشگاه ایلام)



Article Info

Publish Date
21 Apr 2016

Abstract

When in doubt over duty and the absence of reason, it is the time for adhering to practical principle; but, there is disagreement among principalists as to what is the rimary rule in times of doubt. Some scholars including Nāīnī have accepted intellectual innocence as a primary rule, whereas others - especially Shahīd Sadr -believe in intellectual precaution. Nāīnī refers to the rule ‘the indecency of punishment before expression’ in order to seek proof for his view. He considers the dependence of mobility upon the receipt of assignment as one of the kinds of evidence that can be referred to in order to prove intellectual innocence based on the rule of ‘the indecency of punishment before expression’. He believes that punishment for the abandonment of mobility where there had been no cause for mobility will be condemned. On the contrary, Shahīd Sadr criticizes and rejects the idea of Nāīnī and seeks to prove his own idea in light of ‘the right of worship’ theory. The present study conducted in a descriptive analytical manner aims at explaining both views, examining their evidences and arguments, and mentioning the foundations of the ‘the right of worship’ theory. Thus, the validity of Shahīd Sadr’s theory will be proved.

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