This article examines Dominique Janicaud’s critique of the “theological turn” in contemporary French phenomenology, focusing specifically on Michel Henry. Janicaud accuses Henry of abandoning Husserlian principles by incorporating metaphysical essentialism rooted in theology into his phenomenology, thus succumbing to ontotheology. In contrast, this paper argues that Janicaud’s criticism stems from his strict adherence to traditional phenomenology and overlooks Henry’s innovative contributions. By exploring Henry’s concepts of radical immanence, clandestine subjectivity, auto-affection, and Life as pre-ecstatic phenomenality, the study highlights the fundamental differences between traditional phenomenology, which centers on Being, and Henry’s phenomenology, which centers on Life. For Henry, Life precedes and transcends Being. Rather than a deviation, Henry’s approach renews phenomenology by broadening its scope and opening new perspectives. The article further engages with supportive and critical responses to Henry and showing that his reading of Christian texts as phenomenological reading. Ultimately, the paper defends Henry’s phenomenology as a legitimate and radical continuation of the phenomenological project. It offers fertile ground for the future exploration of subjectivity, phenomenality, and the final horizons of manifestation.
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