<![CDATA[This article challenges the Constitutional Court's rigid formalist doctrine of legal standing by critically analysing the position of the Papuan People's Assembly (MRP) in judicial reviews of the Papua Special Autonomy Law. Currently, the Court's strict taxonomy of applicants paradoxically disenfranchises the MRP, creating a dogmatic tension between the asymmetric constitutional guarantees of indigenous rights (Article 18B of the 1945 Constitution) and actual access to constitutional justice. This study aims to expand existing standing doctrines by proposing a theoretical reconstruction of the MRP. Using normative legal research with statutory, conceptual, and case approaches, the study demonstrates that the MRP cannot be treated as a mere product of ordinary legislation. The analysis reveals that the MRP operates as a "functionally constitutional state institution" and a "hybrid constitutional proxy." Its authority is not merely delegated statutory power, but constitutionalised authority essential for protecting the collective rights of Indigenous Papuans (OAP). Restricting its access based on structural formalism constitutes a direct impairment of these constitutional rights. The study concludes with specific policy implications: de lege lata, the Constitutional Court must progressively reinterpret Article 51 of the Constitutional Court Law to accommodate hybrid cultural organs; de lege ferenda, targeted amendments to the Constitutional Court and Special Autonomy Laws are required, alongside the introduction of a limited constitutional complaint mechanism, to permanently secure the MRP's standing and institutionalize a constitutional pathway for indigenous peoples' defense]]>
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