<![CDATA[This study examines indications of political cartelization in the emerging discourse on indirect elections in Indonesia using the cartel party model as its analytical lens. The study employs a qualitative approach through a literature review of conceptual works on cartel parties, empirical studies on political cartelization in Indonesia, and public discourse on indirect elections. The findings reveal three main arguments. First, cartelization has already appeared in direct elections through the formation of oversized coalitions that narrow political competition and reduce political alternatives. Indirect elections may intensify this tendency by shifting competition into parliamentary arenas with limited public oversight. Second, direct elections continue to function as a corrective democratic mechanism through which voters may reject candidates supported by cartel-based political arrangements. This form of public control would likely diminish under an indirect electoral system. Third, the fiscal-efficiency argument commonly used to justify indirect elections warrants closer scrutiny. The study finds that the costs of direct elections remain proportionate to the state budget while also generating significant economic multiplier effects at the local level. Rather than reducing political costs, indirect elections may instead shift open electoral spending into closed-door political transactions among political cartels in parliament.]]>
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