<![CDATA[This article analyzes the compatibility of legislative practices during the lame-duck session with legal policy and siyāsa dustūriyya by examining Law No. 3 of 2024, the Second Amendment to Law No. 6 of 2014 concerning Villages. This study is a normative legal research employing a statutory, conceptual, and comparative approach. Legal materials were analyzed through legal interpretation and prescriptive analysis to assess constitutional legitimacy and the principles of Islamic constitutional law governing the exercise of legislative authority during a political transition. The results of the study indicate that although the House of Representatives retains the constitutional authority to enact laws until the end of its term, the enactment of strategic laws following the emergence of a new electoral mandate has undermined democratic legitimacy. From the perspective of constitutional politics, this practice is not entirely consistent with the principles of maṣlaḥah, al-'adl, amānah, and shūrā. Therefore, Indonesia’s legal policy needs to limit the DPR’s legislative authority during a lame-duck session about strategic laws, while still allowing for the enactment of laws that are urgent, administrative, or intended to prevent a legal vacuum. This finding contributes to the development of the concept of transitional legislative restrictions within Indonesia’s constitutional system.]]>
Copyrights © 2026
