<![CDATA[This article examines the institutional relationship between the President of the Republic of Indonesia and the Regional Representatives Council (DPD) within the framework of the asymmetric bicameral system adopted by Indonesia following the amendments to the 1945 Constitution. The study positions the DPD within two relationships simultaneously: a vertical relationship with the President as head of government, and a horizontal relationship with the People’s Representative Council (DPR) as the dominant chamber in the representative system. This article argues that Indonesia’s highly asymmetric bicameral structure has reduced the DPD to an institutionally marginal body, lacking meaningful checks and balances against either the executive or the DPR. The analysis includes a constitutional review of the DPD’s powers, a comparative analysis with bicameral systems in other countries, an empirical evaluation of the DPD’s effectiveness, and a series of recommendations for constitutional reforms necessary to transform the DPD into a substantive institution of regional representation.]]>
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