<![CDATA[Recent scholarship has clarified Rashīd Riḍā’s maqāṣid- and maṣlaḥah-oriented reformism, the rational and empirical dimensions of individual discussions in Tafsīr al-Manār, and the colonial setting of his political and legal thought. However, it remains unclear whether attention to consequences makes his legal reasoning utilitarian or performs more limited juridical tasks within an Islamic legal framework. This article uses a qualitative, cross-case analysis of six clusters—intoxicants and gambling; zakāt allocation and public finance; ribā under collective need; polygamy; political loyalty and counter-mission funding; and Muslim judges and participation in colonial government. Each cluster is reconstructed through the relation among ḥukm, ʿillah or operative manāṭ, juristic mechanism, authority to establish the relevant facts, and protected maṣlaḥah. The analysis identifies three functions of consequences: corroborating the protective rationale of established prohibitions; establishing and delimiting the conditions of a concession, dispensation, or fiscal priority; and ranking legally available but compromised alternatives under constraint. These findings do not support classifying Riḍā as a utilitarian jurist. Consequences never appear as an autonomous, aggregative, and maximizing criterion of right action; they acquire legal force only after mediation by revelation, legal characterization, domain-specific juristic mechanisms, and authorized competence. The comparison with utilitarianism therefore identifies a limited resemblance in attention to collective effects alongside a decisive difference in normative structure. Colonial institutions changed the objects, thresholds, and stakes of judgment, while Riḍā’s juristic repertoire supplied the forms through which those conditions were legally assessed.]]>
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