<![CDATA[This study aims to analyze the oligopsony market structure in the educational infrastructure procurement process within the Bukittinggi City Education Office and assess the level of budget allocation efficiency resulting from this market structure. Oligopsony occurs when a large number of buyers (in this case the local government as the sole institutional buyer) are faced with a small number of construction service providers and educational material suppliers who dominate the tender process. This condition has the potential to cause price distortion, low competition, and allocative inefficiency in the use of the Regional Revenue and Expenditure Budget (APBD). The study uses a descriptive qualitative approach supported by secondary data analysis in the form of the General Procurement Plan (RUP) document, the Budget Realization Report (LRA), and the results of interviews with procurement officials and service providers. The results indicate an indication of high service provider concentration in several educational infrastructure procurement packages, characterized by a low number of active tender participants and a tendency for bid prices to approach the budget ceiling (Own Estimated Price/HPS). This oligopsony condition contributes to the suboptimal efficiency of budget allocation, reflected in the relatively small difference in savings (efficiency gain) compared to the established budget ceiling. The study recommends strengthening auction transparency, expanding the provider base through an electronic catalog system, and strengthening independent oversight to encourage better efficiency in allocating the education infrastructure procurement budget.]]>
Copyrights © 2026
