<![CDATA[This research examines the construction of the House of Representatives (DPR), specifically Commission XI, oversight on tax revenues, the weaknesses of the existing system, and the ideal design of oversight based on the Supreme Audit Agency (BPK) findings that align with tax data confidentiality. This is a normative legal research utilizing statutory, conceptual, and comparative approaches with the United States congressional oversight mechanism. The results indicate that Commission XI's current oversight is suboptimal due to limited technical capacity, constraints in interpreting tax data confidentiality, fragmented coordination with BPK, short-term political orientation, and the absence of a standardized oversight methodology. To overcome this dysfunction, the oversight mechanism needs to be reconstructed by referencing the joint tax committee model in the United States. This ideal design includes establishing a Tax Analysis Unit as parliamentary technical support, formulating an aggregate tax data access protocol that complies with data confidentiality principles, and creating a structured, legally binding follow -up mechanism for BPK findings.]]>
Copyrights © 2026
