The Indonesian House of Representatives (DPR) plays a strategic role in maintaining democratic accountability through its oversight function. However, the domination of political parties within parliamentary structures often weakens substantive representation and limits the effectiveness of legislative oversight. Members of parliament frequently prioritize party directives over the interests of their constituents, resulting in the marginalization of various social groups in the political decision-making process. This research examines the phenomenon of party domination in the Indonesian parliament and explores the potential of asymmetric representation as an alternative institutional mechanism to strengthen democratic representation and oversight. This study uses normative legal research with statutory, conceptual, and comparative approaches. The research analyzes constitutional provisions related to parliamentary representation and oversight while examining comparative practices of minority representation in several democratic systems.The findings suggest that the dominance of political parties in parliamentary processes has contributed to the limited representation of marginalized groups, such as women, indigenous peoples, informal workers, and persons with disabilities. The introduction of asymmetric representation mechanisms, including reserved seats and minority quotas, may serve as an institutional corrective to enhance inclusivity and strengthen the oversight function of parliament. Strengthening representation is essential to ensure that parliamentary oversight reflects broader public interests rather than partisan agendas
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