<![CDATA[This paper examines the growing dominance of the executive in Indonesia’s constitutional practice and its impact on the weakening oversight function of the House of Representatives (DPR). In principle, the DPR serves as a counterbalance through checks and balances as mandated by the 1945 Constitution. However, a gap persists between this normative ideal and political reality. Using a normative legal approach with statutory and conceptual analysis, this study finds that broad governing coalitions significantly undermine the DPR’s oversight role by blurring the distinction between the overseer and the overseen. The article emphasizes the need to revitalize the DPR’s oversight function by strengthening control mechanisms, fostering informal opposition within parliamentary factions, and limiting executive influence in legislation. These steps are necessary to ensure that checks and balances function not only formally but also substantively in Indonesia’s constitutional system.]]>
Copyrights © 2026
