The amendment of the State-Owned Enterprises Law through Law Number 1 of 2025 has brought changes to the paradigm of governance and oversight of State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs). SOEs operate at the intersection of public and private law regimes, creating challenges in determining the boundaries between the state's interests as a shareholder and the authority of SOEs as corporate legal entities. This study aims to analyze the state financial oversight system for SOEs before and after the amendment of the SOE Law and to formulate an oversight model capable of balancing public accountability with the principles of Good Corporate Governance. This study employs normative legal research using statutory, conceptual, and comparative approaches. Legal materials are analyzed prescriptively through an examination of legislation, legal theories, principles, doctrines, and a comparative study ofState-Owned Enterprise governance in Singapore. The findings indicate that the regulatory changes concerning SOEs have encouraged a paradigm shift from an oversight model predominantly based on public audit toward an approach emphasizing corporate principles,the business judgment rule, and corporate value creation. Nevertheless, a dualism remains between the state finance law regime and the corporate law regime, potentially resulting in overlapping supervisory authority and legal uncertainty for SOE organs. Therefore, a clearer distinction is required between public oversight, which focuses on the state's interests as a shareholder, and corporate oversight, which focuses on the company's operational activities. This model should be supported by risk-based oversight, harmonization of relevant legislation, and coordination among supervisory institutions in order to ensure public accountability while providing legal certainty and sufficient flexibility for SOEs to conduct their business activities.