This study examines the urgency of limiting the object of the House of Representatives’ right of inquiry in exercising its oversight function so that it does not exceed constitutional boundaries. The right of inquiry is an important instrument within the checks and balances mechanism; however, its regulation and implementation still raise legal problems because the objects and subjects that may be summoned by the House are formulated too broadly. This condition may create legal uncertainty, distort the oversight function, and transform the right of inquiry into a political pressure instrument. This research employs normative legal research using statutory, case, and conceptual approaches. The findings show that the broad interpretation of the object of inquiry affects legal certainty, weakens the rule of law, and shifts the House’s oversight function from constitutional control to political maneuvering. Constitutional Court Decisions Number 36/PUU-XV/2017 and Number 16/PUU-XVI/2018 emphasize the need for constitutional limits in the use of the right of inquiry, particularly to prevent interference with pro justitia processes or the independent functions of certain institutions. Therefore, the right of inquiry should be limited to the implementation of laws and/or government policies that are important, strategic, broadly impactful, and allegedly contrary to statutory regulations. It should also be exercised gradually, proportionally, and directed toward policy improvement and strengthening governmental accountability.
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