<![CDATA[Islamic political economy promises distributive justice, social security, accountable markets, and finance connected to productive activity. Yet Indonesia already possesses zakat organizations, sharia supervisory bodies, and a large Islamic financial sector without fully converting those normative commitments into coordinated institutional outcomes. This article explains that gap through a structured integrative library study. Literature was identified through Scopus, Google Scholar, Dimensions, and publisher repositories, complemented by official materials from BAZNAS, the Financial Services Authority (OJK), and Indonesian legislation. Sources were included when they directly addressed Islamic political economy, Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr’s theory, or the governance of zakat, hisbah, and Islamic finance in Indonesia; duplicates, unverifiable opinion pieces, and purely descriptive works without institutional relevance were excluded. The selected materials were coded through four propositions derived from al-Sadr: distribution before production, plural ownership, purposive state intervention, and the rejection of scarcity as a value-neutral master premise. The analysis finds that Indonesia’s implementation gap is produced by downstream bias, fragmented authority, weak coordination, and incentive structures that reward formal compliance more readily than distributive outcomes. Zakat largely repairs income shortfalls after production; modern hisbah functions are dispersed across agencies; and Islamic banking regulation validates contracts more effectively than it measures the distribution of risk, productive assets, and social benefit. The article contributes an institutional reading of al-Sadr and proposes a distribution-chain approach linking access to productive resources, market supervision, risk-sharing finance, and accountable redistribution.]]>
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