<![CDATA[The involvement of the security sector in managing the Covid-19 pandemic demonstrates that health crises have shifted into non-traditional threats with direct implications for national security and human security in Indonesia. However, to date, there is no specific definition or regulatory framework for medical intelligence, resulting in health intelligence-like functions being dispersed across the State Intelligence Agency (BIN), the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI), the Indonesian National Police (Polri), and the Ministry of Health, without clear authority and coordination structures. This study employs a normative juridical method with statutory, conceptual, and case study approaches focused on the Covid-19 pandemic to analyze the regulation of medical intelligence authority within the national health security system, identify weaknesses and disharmonies, and formulate an ideal model. Drawing on theories of authority and Lawrence Friedman's legal system theory, as well as human security and health security frameworks, this research identifies five main problems: a conceptual vacuum, overlapping authority, weak coordination, the absence of integrated data systems and early warning mechanisms, and entrenched sectoral silos among institutions. This article proposes an ideal medical intelligence model based on a hybrid approach that positions BIN as the national intelligence coordinator and the Ministry of Health as the substantive technical lead, accompanied by the establishment of a National Health Intelligence Center, the development of an integrated early detection system, enhanced resource capacity, and oversight mechanisms that guarantee compliance with democratic rule of law principles and the protection of human rights.]]>
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