<![CDATA[Structure that assigns the General Election Supervisory Agency, or Bawaslu, extensive authority over prevention, supervision, examination, sanctioning, and adjudication. The diversity of administrative misconduct, however, is not consistently matched by differentiated enforcement procedures, creating risks of excessive proceduralization for correctable violations and inadequate protection when governmental action directly affects electoral rights. This study examines the institutional configuration of administrative electoral enforcement and formulates an alternative governance model through qualitative legal and institutional analysis. The research examines electoral legislation, Bawaslu regulations, documented administrative violation practices, and peer reviewed literature concerning electoral management, administrative enforcement, institutional capacity, and election governance. The findings identify three structural problems: functional concentration within Bawaslu, insufficient differentiation between compliance restoration and rights adjudication, and the absence of systematic criteria for determining enforcement intensity. This study proposes a Differentiated Administrative Enforcement Model comprising the Corrective Compliance Track, Proportional Administrative Sanction Track, and Rights Protection Adjudication Track. Case allocation is determined through six variables consisting of legal actor, direct legal harm, seriousness, reversibility, recurrence, and electoral urgency. Functional separation between examination and adjudication complements this structure without requiring a new electoral institution. The model demonstrates that effective election governance requires administrative responses that are proportionate, timely, accountable, and capable of protecting electoral rights]]>
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