<![CDATA[For two decades (2004-2024), the Regional Representative Council (DPD) of the Republic of Indonesia has been normatively designed to be filled by individuals, distancing it from Political Parties. Article 22E Paragraph (4) of the 1945 Constitution, the Law on General Elections, and the Decisions of the Constitutional Court affirm this normative framework. However, the empirical reality shows that many DPD members are actually affiliated with political parties. In line with this, the DPD, which is designed with weak authority (Soft Bicameralism), is unable to significantly improve the function of the representative body. This article conducts a critical evaluation of both the normative design and the empirical reality with the aim of providing a model that enables the potential strengthening of the DPD as a regional representation. The research concludes: First, the design of electing DPD members through general elections naturally requires extensive networks and substantial funding, so that even independent (individual) candidates often need political parties that naturally possess networks in society. This reality is shown by DPD members who are not political party executives but essentially have affiliations with political parties; Second, there is a need for a suitable (fit) design between the candidacy requirements and the election mechanism. If the general election mechanism is maintained, the candidacy requirements should not only be for individuals but could also involve political parties. If the individual candidacy requirement is maintained, there needs to be a redesign of the election mechanism into an indirect election by each regional government at the provincial level.]]>
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