<![CDATA[The Ombudsman of the Republic of Indonesia (ORI) is designed as an independent state auxiliary organ to oversee the administration of public services, ensuring freedom from the intervention of other branches of power. However, in practice, the legal nature of ORI's output, which is merely a "Recommendation" lacking coercive enforcement power, creates a constitutional dilemma between independence and accountability. This study aims to analyze the characteristics of the legal dilemma between ORI's functional independence and the demands for democratic accountability, as well as to reconstruct an ideal oversight model based on the principle of checks and balances. The research method applied is normative legal research utilizing both a statutory approach and a conceptual approach. The results indicate that ORI experiences a crisis of authority due to the absence of direct sanctions for institutions that ignore its recommendations. Conversely, granting direct enforcement powers risks transforming ORI into a "super body" agency, which would violate the principle of separation of powers. As a solution, this study proposes a reconstruction of indirect accountability through the optimization of inter-organizational compliance, whereby the superior of the reported institution is strictly required to execute administrative sanctions. This model preserves ORI's core identity as an independent oversight body while ensuring authoritative accountability within the constitutional system.]]>
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