<![CDATA[Checks and balances constitute a fundamental principle of modern constitutionalism, evolving from the separation of powers to prevent the concentration of governmental authority and ensure institutional accountability. This study comparatively examines the design and effectiveness of legislative oversight over the executive in Indonesia’s presidential system and Japan’s parliamentary system. Using a normative-juridical method, the study applies statutory, conceptual, and comparative approaches through analysis of constitutional provisions, legislation, institutional documents, and legal scholarship. The findings show that Indonesia adopts a relative separation of powers, with the House of Representatives (DPR) exercising legislative, budgetary, and oversight functions to constrain executive authority. Japan, by contrast, employs a parliamentary system characterized by a fusion of powers, in which the Cabinet is politically accountable to the National Diet. The effectiveness of checks and balances depends on political configurations, institutional capacity, and constitutional arrangements. Thus, checks and balances are context-dependent mechanisms shaped by each system’s constitutional and political structure.]]>
Copyrights © 2027
