<![CDATA[The academic and policy debate on central bank digital currency has been organised around a binary questionwhether a central bank should issue one and around a theoretical concern, bank disintermediation, that is calibrated to advanced-economy deposit markets. This commentary argues that the framing misidentifies the object of interest. In emerging Asia, the monetary innovation with the largest measurable effect on transaction costs, merchant formalisation, and household payment behaviour has not been a token; it has been a publicly governed instant retail payment rail with interoperable acceptance and mandated pricing. Indonesia's QRIS, which processed 12.55 billion transactions worth IDR 600.69 trillion in the first half of 2026 across 44.86 million merchants, is the clearest illustration. Meanwhile the country's central bank has pursued a deliberately wholesale-first digital currency design, which is the correct sequencing but is poorly served by a literature preoccupied with retail run risk. The commentary makes three arguments: that the disintermediation literature's welfare conclusions are not portable to markets with low deposit betas and high cash intensity; that the welfare risk in these markets has migrated to the credit side, where algorithmic underwriting and rapidly deteriorating fintech loan performance interact; and that supervisory capacity, not currency design, is the binding constraint. Three reframed research questions are proposed. Keywords: central bank digital currency; retail payment systems; financial inclusion; fintech credit; algorithmic underwriting]]>
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