Journal of International Political Economy and Strategy
Journal of International Political Economy and Strategy (JIPES) is an international peer-reviewed academic journal dedicated to advancing research at the intersection of international political economy, economic policy, global business, international finance, and strategic studies. The journal provides a global scholarly platform for academics, researchers, policymakers, and practitioners to examine how states, markets, firms, international institutions, and societies interact within an increasingly interconnected and uncertain global economy. JIPES aims to publish theoretically informed, empirically rigorous, and policy-relevant research that contributes to a deeper understanding of the political, economic, institutional, and strategic forces shaping international and regional developments. Particular attention is given to research addressing cross-border economic relations, global governance, geopolitical and geo-economic competition, international trade and investment, financial systems, development, institutional transformation, and strategic responses to changes in the global political economy. The journal welcomes studies from all regions of the world and strongly encourages comparative, cross-country, regional, and international perspectives. Research focusing on individual countries is also welcomed when it demonstrates clear relevance to broader international political economy debates, comparative scholarship, global policy challenges, or strategic implications beyond the specific national context. JIPES promotes interdisciplinary scholarship connecting economics, political science, international relations, public policy, business, finance, development studies, and strategic management. Both established and emerging perspectives are welcomed where they contribute to understanding contemporary transformations in the international political and economic system.
Articles
10 Documents
<![CDATA[Indonesia’s response as a developing country to the United States government’s reciprocal tariff policy ]]>
<![CDATA[Winda Yulia Sari]]>
<![CDATA[ Journal of International Political Economy and Strategy Vol. 1 No. 1 (2026): February 2026 ]]>
Publisher : <![CDATA[Privietlab ]]>
Show Abstract
|
Download Original
|
Original Source
|
Check in Google Scholar
<![CDATA[The acceleration of economic growth in Indonesia is also influenced by tariff policies that support international trade, such as the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (AFTA). However, aggressive tariff policies can create challenges, including intense competition and adverse consequences for certain domestic sectors. The higher reciprocal tariff imposed by the United States on Indonesia, amounting to 32%, constitutes the greatest challenge to the competitiveness of Indonesian exports, particularly key commodities such as electronics, textiles, and footwear. This study aims to analyze Indonesia’s response, as a developing country, to the reciprocal tariff policy adopted by the United States government. This study used a descriptive qualitative method with a literature review. The findings show that the reciprocal tariff policy imposed on Indonesian export commodities reflects the dominant power position of the United States in determining trade rules that affect developing countries such as Indonesia. The tariff policy may reduce the volume and competitiveness of Indonesian exports in the U.S. market, lower production, increase the risk of layoffs, and contribute to the depreciation of the rupiah’s value. In addition, the findings indicate that Indonesia remains highly dependent on the United States market, both in terms of export volume and trade surplus value. Therefore, the Indonesian Government has taken diplomatic measures by pursuing direct negotiations with the United States, preparing proposals for bilateral economic cooperation, and strengthening regional cooperation with ASEAN countries.]]>
<![CDATA[Institutional transformation and governance in Indonesia: Democracy, decentralization, and the persistence of oligarchy ]]>
<![CDATA[Dimvy Rusefani Asetya]]>
<![CDATA[ Journal of International Political Economy and Strategy Vol. 1 No. 1 (2026): February 2026 ]]>
Publisher : <![CDATA[Privietlab ]]>
Show Abstract
|
Download Original
|
Original Source
|
Check in Google Scholar
<![CDATA[This paper undertakes a systematic examination of Indonesia's political economy, with particular emphasis on the trajectory of institutional transformation and governance since the collapse of Suharto's New Order regime in 1998. Drawing on comparative political economy, historical institutionalism, and contemporary empirical scholarship, the study analyzes how Indonesia's transition from authoritarian rule to electoral democracy has produced a complex, contested, and often contradictory institutional landscape. The paper identifies four interconnected dynamics that define contemporary Indonesian governance: the partial consolidation of democratic institutions, the deepening of administrative decentralization under the Big Bang reforms of 1999-2001, the persistence of oligarchic power networks that have adapted to electoral competition, and the uneven progress of bureaucratic reform and anti-corruption governance. The analysis reveals that while Indonesia has achieved significant milestones—including the institutionalization of free and fair elections, constitutional reform, and the direct election of regional executives—these gains remain fragile in the face of money politics, elite accommodation, and weak rule-of-law enforcement. The paper argues that Indonesia exemplifies a form of 'oligarchic democracy' in which competitive elections coexist with entrenched structures of patrimonial power, resource capture, and regulatory arbitrage. Implications for developmental state capacity and long-run governance outcomes are discussed, and a research agenda for comparative Southeast Asian political economy is proposed.]]>
<![CDATA[Tariff wars and the Global South: Economic impact and trade flow implications of the contemporary tariff conflict ]]>
<![CDATA[Olivia Putri Dahlan]]>
<![CDATA[ Journal of International Political Economy and Strategy Vol. 1 No. 1 (2026): February 2026 ]]>
Publisher : <![CDATA[Privietlab ]]>
Show Abstract
|
Download Original
|
Original Source
|
Check in Google Scholar
<![CDATA[The resurgence of protectionist trade policy in the twenty-first century has precipitated a complex and consequential realignment of the global trading architecture. This study examines the economic impact and trade flow implications of the contemporary tariff conflict—commonly referred to as the "tariff war"—on economies of the Global South, comprising developing and emerging-market nations across Sub-Saharan Africa, South and Southeast Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. Drawing on macroeconomic data from the World Trade Organization (WTO), World Bank, and International Monetary Fund (IMF), this paper employs a multi-dimensional analytical framework incorporating trade diversion theory, terms-of-trade analysis, and computable general equilibrium (CGE) modelling insights to assess short- and medium-term economic consequences. The findings indicate that Global South economies face asymmetric and disproportionate exposure to tariff escalation initiated between major trading powers, particularly the United States and China, due to their structural dependence on commodity exports, limited export diversification, and vulnerability to capital flow reversals. While certain countries have accrued marginal gains through trade diversion, the aggregate macroeconomic effects—including GDP contraction, inflationary pressure, currency depreciation, and deteriorating terms of trade—are substantially negative. This paper argues that the tariff war fundamentally represents a structural threat to the development trajectories of Global South economies, underscoring the urgency of coordinated multilateral policy responses and South-South trade integration as adaptive strategies.]]>
<![CDATA[Indonesia’s political economy at a crossroads: Growth, power, and the limits of developmental pragmatism ]]>
<![CDATA[Fawaz Muhammad Khaer]]>
<![CDATA[ Journal of International Political Economy and Strategy Vol. 1 No. 1 (2026): February 2026 ]]>
Publisher : <![CDATA[Privietlab ]]>
Show Abstract
|
Download Original
|
Original Source
|
Check in Google Scholar
<![CDATA[This opinion article argues that the central problem in Indonesia’s contemporary political economy is not the absence of growth but the political organization of growth. Indonesia entered the Prabowo era with enviable macroeconomic resilience: output expanded by 5.11% in 2025, poverty and inequality both declined, unemployment remained below 5%, and Bank Indonesia maintained the policy rate at 4.75% while continuing to frame inflation and external stability as manageable. However, these achievements coexist with enduring weaknesses in the rule of law, corruption control, democratic accountability, tax capacity, and market contestability. In my view, Indonesia’s greatest risk is not a sudden collapse but developmental stagnation disguised as success: respectable headline growth resting on concentrated power, commodity-centered industrialization, and discretionary state activism. The continuity from Jokowi’s developmentalism to Prabowo’s more assertive state activism is real, but continuity alone will not deliver inclusive prosperity. Indonesia does not need a retreat from industrial or social policy but a more democratic and rule-bound version of both. This means linking downstreaming to productivity and innovation, expanding services-sector competitiveness, strengthening the tax state, and rebuilding institutions that can discipline rent-seeking without paralyzing development.]]>
<![CDATA[The Indonesian Government's responsibility for Trump's tariff policy as an international economic policy ]]>
<![CDATA[Mirah Delima]]>;
<![CDATA[Asma Wahyuni]]>;
<![CDATA[Puja Oktovia Yosrianti]]>
<![CDATA[ Journal of International Political Economy and Strategy Vol. 1 No. 1 (2026): February 2026 ]]>
Publisher : <![CDATA[Privietlab ]]>
Show Abstract
|
Download Original
|
Original Source
|
Check in Google Scholar
<![CDATA[Economic relations between countries are regulated and directed by international economic policies, one of which is international trade relations. However, international trade can be hampered by international economic policies, such as the imposition of import tariffs by US President Donald Trump, which imposed a 32% tariff on Indonesian products. This policy has had a negative impact, particularly on labor-intensive exports and fisheries, and on Indonesia's macroeconomic stability. This study aims to determine the responsiveness of the Indonesian government in addressing the impacts of Trump's import tariff policy. The method used in this study is descriptive qualitative with a literature review approach. The results show that this policy has led to a decline in the volume and competitiveness of Indonesian exports in the US market, decreased production, the risk of layoffs, and the depreciation of the rupiah exchange rate. To address this, the Indonesian government will assess the economic impact and take negotiating steps by sending a delegation to the United States, preparing proposals for bilateral economic cooperation, strengthening regional cooperation with ASEAN countries, diversifying export markets, maintaining monetary stability, providing fiscal incentives, and increasing domestic consumption. This response demonstrates Indonesia's seriousness and responsiveness to the impact of the United States' tariff policy by striving to maintain the resilience and sustainability of the Indonesian economy.]]>
<![CDATA[The price of optionality: Geoeconomic fragmentation and the repricing of middle-power hedging ]]>
<![CDATA[Mochammad Dandi]]>
<![CDATA[ Journal of International Political Economy and Strategy Vol. 1 No. 2 (2026): August 2026 ]]>
Publisher : <![CDATA[Privietlab ]]>
Show Abstract
|
Download Original
|
Original Source
|
Check in Google Scholar
|
DOI: 10.55942/jipes.v1i2.2223
<![CDATA[Middle powers in Southeast Asia have long been credited with a distinctive competence: the ability to remain economically engaged with rival great powers simultaneously. This commentary argues that the analytical vocabulary used to describe this competence, hedging, multi-alignment, and non-alignment, was developed under conditions that no longer hold and that the strategy is now being systematically repriced. Drawing on the empirical literature on geoeconomic fragmentation and international relations scholarship on small-state alignment, this commentary advances three claims. First, fragmentation research and hedging research have proceeded in parallel without engaging one another, producing a blind spot: the former treats alignment as an exogenous covariate of trade costs, while the latter treats trade costs as the background to alignment choices. Second, hedging is best understood as a portfolio of options whose premium was historically close to zero and is now being converted into contingent obligations, rules-of-origin scrutiny, transhipment penalties, alignment-conditional market access, and reciprocal commitments negotiated bilaterally rather than multilaterally. Third, the binding constraint on the returns to hedging is not diplomatic skill but domestic policy coherence. When the trade regime is internally contradictory, external optionality cannot be converted into industrial upgrading. Indonesia's 2025–2026 sequence of overlapping commitments provides the illustrative case. The commentary closes with three testable propositions and a research agenda.]]>
<![CDATA[Disclosure without a price: The sequencing error in emerging-market climate finance ]]>
<![CDATA[Sahara Putri Dahlan]]>
<![CDATA[ Journal of International Political Economy and Strategy Vol. 1 No. 2 (2026): August 2026 ]]>
Publisher : <![CDATA[Privietlab ]]>
Show Abstract
|
Download Original
|
Original Source
|
Check in Google Scholar
|
DOI: 10.55942/jipes.v1i2.2224
<![CDATA[Emerging economies have built the reporting architecture of climate policy far faster than they have built its price signal. Indonesia illustrates this pattern with unusual clarity: a sustainable finance taxonomy, a national carbon exchange operating since 2023, and a consultation on mandatory ISSB-aligned disclosure sit alongside a carbon levy legislated in 2021 that has still not commenced and an exchange whose cumulative turnover through June 2026 amounted to roughly IDR 94 billion. This commentary argues that the ordering is not merely slow but analytically backwards, and that the cost of the error has recently become explicit. Three claims are developed. First, the disclosure literature shows that mandatory reporting changes measured behavior modestly and measured ratings not at all consistently, because rating divergence is driven by construct disagreement rather than by data scarcity; disclosure therefore cannot substitute for a price. Second, the carbon pricing literature shows that even modest prices reduce emissions when they are credible and cover the relevant margin, which makes deferral a policy choice rather than a technical necessity. Third, with the European carbon border adjustment mechanism entering its compliance phase on 1 January 2026, the fiscal consequence of deferral is no longer domestic: uncollected carbon revenue is now collected abroad. A sequencing proposal follows.]]>
<![CDATA[Compliance is not transformation: The substance gap in Islamic finance and the halal economy ]]>
<![CDATA[Rifqi Aqil Asyrof]]>
<![CDATA[ Journal of International Political Economy and Strategy Vol. 1 No. 2 (2026): August 2026 ]]>
Publisher : <![CDATA[Privietlab ]]>
Show Abstract
|
Download Original
|
Original Source
|
Check in Google Scholar
|
DOI: 10.55942/jipes.v1i2.2225
<![CDATA[Islamic finance and the halal economy are governed by two parallel certification regimes that have matured institutionally while under-delivering on their developmental promises. This commentary argues that both regimes share a single design flaw: they certify form, contractual structure in finance, ingredient, and process provenance in goods, while remaining largely silent on the outcome. The evidence was consistent across both domains. Indonesian Islamic banking assets reached IDR 1,061 trillion by March 2026, growing 10.49 percent year on year, yet the sector's share of banking assets has remained close to 7 percent for more than a decade; global sukuk issuance reached a record USD 264.8 billion in 2025, of which sustainable instruments accounted for only USD 21.5 billion; and Indonesia has certified over 13 million products as halal, overwhelmingly from micro and small enterprises, while extending mandatory enforcement to October 2026. The commentary makes three arguments: that the empirical literature comparing Islamic and conventional banks has been measuring the wrong dependent variable; that the market share plateau is a symptom of the form–substance gap rather than a marketing problem; and that halal certification now functions simultaneously as a religious institution, consumer protection instrument, and trade-governance device, with the three functions in unacknowledged tension. A measurement agenda was proposed.]]>
<![CDATA[China, FOCAC, and the politics of hegemony in South Africa ]]>
<![CDATA[Muhamad Andhika Pradana]]>;
<![CDATA[Elfrine Hingis Manampiring]]>
<![CDATA[ Journal of International Political Economy and Strategy Vol. 1 No. 2 (2026): August 2026 ]]>
Publisher : <![CDATA[Privietlab ]]>
Show Abstract
|
Download Original
|
Original Source
|
Check in Google Scholar
|
DOI: 10.55942/jipes.v1i2.2226
<![CDATA[China’s rapid economic growth, and the development of diversified industries in the country encourage the presence of ambitions for China to exert their influence on world politics. The condition of the African region, which is still plagued by poverty and hunger, has made China consider that the African region is the right area for them to exert influence. China established the FOCAC forum to provide investment assistance funds to African countries. South Africa, which China considers to have significant regional influence, is the recipient of a large number of FOCAC investment donors. Various kinds of investment assistance in the economic sector provided by China to South Africa. With South Africa’s political view that has a positive perspective on the policies issued by China through the FOCAC program, China can easily exert their political influence in the African region. South Africa has become China’s partner in launching their economic and political interests in the African region. Keywords: China; South Africa; FOCAC; hegemony; investment.]]>
<![CDATA[Rails before tokens: Why the CBDC debate is the wrong frame for monetary innovation in emerging Asia ]]>
<![CDATA[Fawaz Muhammad Khaer]]>
<![CDATA[ Journal of International Political Economy and Strategy Vol. 1 No. 2 (2026): August 2026 ]]>
Publisher : <![CDATA[Privietlab ]]>
Show Abstract
|
Download Original
|
Original Source
|
Check in Google Scholar
|
DOI: 10.55942/jipes.v1i2.2227
<![CDATA[The academic and policy debate on central bank digital currency has been organised around a binary questionwhether a central bank should issue one and around a theoretical concern, bank disintermediation, that is calibrated to advanced-economy deposit markets. This commentary argues that the framing misidentifies the object of interest. In emerging Asia, the monetary innovation with the largest measurable effect on transaction costs, merchant formalisation, and household payment behaviour has not been a token; it has been a publicly governed instant retail payment rail with interoperable acceptance and mandated pricing. Indonesia's QRIS, which processed 12.55 billion transactions worth IDR 600.69 trillion in the first half of 2026 across 44.86 million merchants, is the clearest illustration. Meanwhile the country's central bank has pursued a deliberately wholesale-first digital currency design, which is the correct sequencing but is poorly served by a literature preoccupied with retail run risk. The commentary makes three arguments: that the disintermediation literature's welfare conclusions are not portable to markets with low deposit betas and high cash intensity; that the welfare risk in these markets has migrated to the credit side, where algorithmic underwriting and rapidly deteriorating fintech loan performance interact; and that supervisory capacity, not currency design, is the binding constraint. Three reframed research questions are proposed. Keywords: central bank digital currency; retail payment systems; financial inclusion; fintech credit; algorithmic underwriting]]>
