Purpose: This study examines competitive behavior in Indonesian oligopolistic industries and explores how strategic interdependence influences firms’ pricing and capacity decisions through game theory. Research Methodology: Using an explanatory quantitative approach, this study applies game-theoretic simulation modeling to two concentrated industries: mobile telecommunications (Telkomsel and Indosat) as differentiated-product competition and cement (Semen Indonesia and Indocement) as homogeneous-product competition. Secondary data from annual reports, financial statements, and industry records for 2024 are used to construct demand functions, payoff matrices, and equilibrium models through dominance analysis and best-response functions.Results: The findings show that telecommunications competition follows a Prisoner’s Dilemma structure, where aggressive pricing may reduce mutual profitability. In contrast, the Stackelberg model better captures cement industry dynamics by highlighting the strategic advantage of first-mover positioning.Conclusions: Game-theoretic analysis provides insights into competitive behavior and equilibrium patterns in Indonesian oligopolistic markets, suggesting the importance of shifting from price competition toward differentiation strategies.Limitations: The study is limited by static one-shot game assumptions and two representative duopoly cases, which may not fully reflect repeated interactions, regulatory changes, and long-term market dynamics.Contribution: This study advances competitive strategy literature by offering a market-structure perspective that explains how oligopolistic conditions shape firms’ strategic choices and competitive responses in emerging economies.
Copyrights © 2026