<![CDATA[Purpose: This study examines how judicial power in Nigeria can be held within constitutional and ethical limits without weakening judicial independence, and how the handling of misconduct and sanctions shapes public confidence in the courts. Research Methodology: The study uses a qualitative doctrinal and documentary design. It analyzes the 1999 Constitution, the Code of Conduct for Judicial Officers, the Administration of Criminal Justice Act 2015, and recent peer-reviewed literature. A comparative reading of the United Kingdom, France, South Africa and Ghana informs the analysis, which is framed by Rule of Law Theory and Institutional Theory. Results: Independence and accountability work as complementary safeguards. The weakest points in the Nigerian arrangement are the unclear line between correctable error and punishable misconduct, the low visibility of disciplinary outcomes, uneven sanctioning, and chronic delay that the public tends to attribute to judges. Conclusions: Public confidence follows institutional performance more than institutional publicity, and credible discipline depends on due process and proportionality. Limitations: The study relies on documents and published scholarship rather than interviews, court data or disciplinary files. Contributions: The study offers an error-misconduct filter, a graduated sanctions matrix and a framework linking discipline, delay and technology to public confidence.]]>
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