<![CDATA[ICSID has long been regarded as a neutral forum for resolving disputes between foreign investors and host countries. However, various developing countries have criticized a tendency to favor investor interests, particularly when awards require the state to pay substantial compensation for legitimate public policies. Unlike the WTO, which employs a two-tier system, ICSID continues to use a single-tier system with an annulment mechanism limited to procedural aspects. This article argues that a WTO-style appeals system is not appropriate for the ICSID, given that the finality of awards is a fundamental characteristic of arbitration. Instead, limited reforms to the annulment mechanism are necessary to ensure substantive justice while maintaining the efficiency of the arbitration system. This study employs a normative legal methodology using statutory, case law, comparative, and conceptual approaches to evaluate the position of developing countries in ICSID disputes, the structural differences between the WTO and ICSID, and the need for reform of the annulment mechanism. The findings indicate the need to expand the grounds for annulment, standardize interpretation, strengthen the tribunal’s legal reasoning, and ensure more balanced geographical representation. These limited reforms are essential for creating an investment dispute resolution mechanism that is fairer, more accountable, and respectful of the sovereignty of developing countries.]]>
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