Work discipline is a proximal form of rule-compliant behavior that is central to public-sector reliability but is less frequently examined than employee performance or public service motivation. This study investigates whether leadership style and additional employee income operate as complementary managerial and economic governance mechanisms associated with civil-servant discipline. A quantitative census survey involved all 32 employees of the Southeast Sulawesi Provincial Forestry Service, Indonesia. Data were collected using a five-point Likert questionnaire and analyzed with multiple linear regression. The instruments showed satisfactory internal consistency (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.887–0.911). Leadership style was positively associated with work discipline (β = 0.401, p = 0.009), as was additional employee income (β = 0.443, p = 0.004). The model was significant (F = 15.076, p < 0.001) and explained 51.0% of the variance in discipline (R² = 0.510). The findings suggest that financial incentives do not substitute for leadership; rather, relational-managerial and economic-incentive mechanisms may jointly reinforce rule-compliant behavior. The study contributes context-bound evidence from a subnational public organization with administrative and field-based responsibilities.
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