<![CDATA[This article examines Epicurus's claim that death is not bad by analyzing the temporal structure of life that has been overlooked in his argument. Employing methods of argumentative reconstruction, external critique with temporal perspective, and comparative analysis, this study tests Epicurus's axiological foundations within two temporal frameworks: linear and cyclical time. Within the linear framework, through Heidegger's ontology of time, Nagel's deprivation theory, and Gilmore's concept of personal time, it is found that death is bad in a deprivative sense because it precludes the actualization of value, severs personal narrative, and ends the flow of experience that serves as the container for projects and meaning. Within the cyclical framework, through readings of Hindu-Buddhist traditions, Chinese philosophy, and Whitehead's process philosophy, it is found that death is bad as a discontinuity of value participation—a transition from active participation as a subject to passive participation as an object of memory and impact. Both frameworks, despite different ontologies, converge on the same conclusion: death is an objective loss irreducible to mere absence of sensation. The article concludes that Epicurus's claim survives only in a temporal vacuum, and the debate about death's badness is fundamentally a debate about the ontology of time.]]>
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