Sany Group's downstream vertical integration through a non-exclusive selling agreement raises legal issues regarding market control and PT PBT's competitiveness as a downstream partner, as well as the recovery of losses arising from such practices. This study aims to analyze the implications of downstream vertical integration through a non-exclusive selling agreement on market control and the competitiveness of downstream partners, as well as to examine the legal strategies available to PT PBT to enhance its prospects of recovering its losses. This study employs a normative juridical research method using the statute approach and case approach with reference to Law No. 5 of 1999, Law No. 30 of 1999, KPPU Decision No. 18/KPPU-L/2024, and the relevant court decisions. The findings show that changes in Sany's distribution structure through its subsidiary entities expanded Sany's involvement at the downstream level and restricted PT PBT's business activities by terminating supplies and directly competing in the distribution market. These actions affected market control and PT PBT's competitiveness, and the KPPU found them to violate Article 14 and Article 19 of Law No. 5 of 1999. Furthermore, the obstacles encountered by PT PBT in its civil claim were not caused by an incorrect application of law by the courts but rather by the existence of an arbitration clause, thereby indicating that a recovery strategy may be pursued by positioning a report to the KPPU as a competition law enforcement mechanism and arbitration as the appropriate forum for recovery based on the contractual relationship between the parties.
Copyrights © 2026