Proving ecological damage in environmental criminal trials is not merely a procedural issue, but rather reflects a profound philosophical contestation regarding the nature of law itself. This article examines the problematic of proving environmental crimes in Indonesia through three main legal philosophical lenses: Legal Positivism (Austin and Kelsen), Legal Realism, and Critical Legal Studies (CLS). Using normative legal research methods enriched by statutory and conceptual approaches, this paper demonstrates that structural weaknesses in proving ecological crimes are not merely the result of technical regulatory deficiencies, but rather reflect tensions between the philosophical structures of law that have characterized the Indonesian criminal justice system. Legal Positivism, the foundation of the Criminal Procedure Code (KUHAP), now updated through Law Number 20 of 2025, creates epistemological limitations in accommodating probabilistic scientific truth. Legal Realism exposes actual judicial practice, where judges' decisions are more influenced by the hegemony of paid corporate experts than by the textual norms of the law. Critical Legal Studies uncovers the ideological dimension of criminal procedural law's inability to uphold ecological justice, which is essentially a structural protection for capital interests. The reform agenda formulated in this article rests on a philosophical reconstruction of evidentiary law that moves beyond positivistic formalism to environmentally conscious substantive justice.Keywords: Ecological Proof; Criminal Procedural Law; Legal Positivism; Legal Realism; Critical Legal Studies
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