<![CDATA[Political connections and board size are central corporate governance issues in publicly listed state-owned enterprises (SOEs), where government ownership and political involvement may shape corporate decision-making. Prior studies report inconsistent findings on how political connections and board size relate to firm performance, and evidence focusing on Indonesian listed SOEs remains limited. This study therefore examines the effects of political connections and board size on the firm performance of publicly listed SOEs in Indonesia during 2020–2024. Using secondary data from the Indonesia Stock Exchange and company annual reports, and purposive sampling, it analyzes 40 firm-year observations from eight non-financial listed SOEs. Firm performance is measured by return on assets (ROA), political connections by a dummy variable indicating at least one politically connected commissioner, and board size by the number of commissioners. The data are analyzed using descriptive statistics, classical assumption tests, and multiple linear regression. The results show that political connections and board size both have positive and significant effects on firm performance, and the model explains 37.3% of the variation in ROA (adjusted R² = 0.373). The findings contribute to Agency Theory and Resource Dependence Theory by showing that political connections and board size can function as strategic resources in Indonesian listed SOEs. Practically, they underline the importance of managing political connections transparentlyand maintaining an effective board size. Given the small sample, the results should be interpreted with caution. Keywords: Political Connections; Board Size; Firm Performance; Return on Assets; State-Owned Enterprises.]]>
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