Indonesia's asymmetric decentralization framework has been applied exclusively at the provincial level, leaving regencies and cities which the 1945 Constitution recognizes as equal-footing local government units outside the scope of differentiated governance arrangements. This study examines the constitutional permissibility, theoretical foundations, and empirical justifications for extending asymmetric decentralization to the regency/city level. Employing a normative-legal design with a sequential dual-method approach combining purposive and living constitution interpretation, alongside a structured comparative case analysis using Most Different Systems Design (MDSD) across four international cases—Catalonia and the Basque Country (Spain), South Tyrol (Italy), the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region (the Philippines), and the former special status of Jammu & Kashmir (India) this study finds that the province-centric application of asymmetry reflects legislative convention rather than constitutional necessity. Primary legal sources include the 1945 Constitution, Law No. 23 of 2014 on Regional Government, and five special autonomy statutes governing Aceh, Papua, Yogyakarta, Jakarta, and Nusantara. Articles 18(1) and 18B (1) of the 1945 Constitution contain no explicit restriction confining asymmetric arrangements to the provincial tier. Drawing on four empirical sub-provincial cases Batam, Denpasar, Nusa Penida, and Nunukan this study develops a four-type typology of sub-provincial asymmetric regions and a multi-dimensional eligibility matrix. The transferability assessment identifies legal entrenchment, institutional capacity thresholds, and conflict-origin constraints as critical design variables. The study's principal conceptual contributions are a four-type typology of sub-provincial asymmetric regions and a multi-dimensional eligibility matrix applicable as a replicable policy screening instrument for Indonesia and other unitary states. These findings carry direct policy implications for Indonesia's decentralization reform agenda, particularly in informing the legislative design of sub-provincial asymmetric arrangements grounded in the existing constitutional framework.
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