<![CDATA[Law Number 19 of 2019 places the Corruption Eradication Commission within the executive branch while retaining its coordination and supervision duties under Article 6 letters b and d, operationalized through Articles 8 and 10 and strengthened by the takeover mechanism in Article 10A. The issue examined is not the de jure loss of these functions, but the absence of binding regulation requiring the Police, the Prosecutor’s Office, and the Corruption Eradication Commission to determine jurisdictional allocation before suspects are named. This article analyzes how ambiguity in post-amendment investigative authority creates space for institutional ego-centrism and how Collaborative Anti-Corruption Governance may restore institutional coherence. This doctrinal legal research uses statutory, conceptual, and case approaches to primary, secondary, and tertiary legal materials. Two suspect designations by the Attorney General’s Office and the National Police in July 2026 are used as real cases and analyzed normatively. The analysis shows that parallel investigative authority under the Criminal Procedure Code, the Corruption Eradication Commission Law, and other sectoral laws is not yet accompanied by rules allocating operational roles consequently, Article 50 of Law Number 30 of 2002 functions merely as a notification obligation. This article proposes a law-based power-sharing mechanism grounded in the Commission’s coordination and supervision functions through a mandatory joint case-title forum when corruption involves individuals from two or more law enforcement institutions, supported by decision-making rules, conflict-of-interest mitigation, and a rigid objection mechanism.]]>
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