This research employs a literature review to establish a theoretical framework for the merit system, government performance, and a case study of paradoxes, with a focus on potential problems in filling executive service positions (JPT) as a driver of government performance. Furthermore, theories related to the merit system and government performance are juxtaposed with case studies or potential problems that may arise in filling JPT positions, reflecting gaps in the ideal framework. Four potential paradoxes were identified in the selection process for JPT positions. First, there are potential problems with the authority of the elected officials (PPK) to select the best JPT candidates; second, potential conflicts of interest within the open selection committee; third, potential loopholes in the paper writing method in the open selection process; and fourth, problems in filling JPT positions through the talent management (MT) mechanism. To prevent these paradoxes and hinder government performance, this study proposes three strategies. First, encouraging the PPK to implement the principle of "political goodwill," second, adjusting provisions and creating technical guidelines to address legal gaps during the open selection process, and third, evaluating the policy of filling JPT positions through MT, recognizing the potential for "sunset law".
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