<![CDATA[ Indonesia’s Financial Services Authority Regulation No. 22/POJK.04/2021 permits startups organized as limited liability companies to issue multiple voting shares at their initial public offering, creating a structural wedge between economic ownership and voting power that risks abuse in general meetings to the detriment of minority investors. Employing normative legal research with statutory and conceptual approaches, this article examines the standing and limits of multiple-voting shareholders in general meetings, the legal consequences of voting-right abuse under the fiduciary duty doctrine, and the effectiveness of available mitigation instruments for minority investors. The analysis finds that POJK 22/2021 imposes preventive quantitative and procedural safeguards, yet fiduciary duty textually binds only directors and commissioners, so voting-right abuse must instead be pursued through tort liability and piercing the corporate veil, while existing repressive instruments remain constrained by voting-based ownership thresholds. Strengthening contractual mechanisms and regulatory supervision is therefore necessary for effective minority-investor protection.]]>
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