<![CDATA[Differences in scholarly opinions regarding the legal status of bank interest remain a significant issue in Islamic economic law. This debate concerns not only legal rulings but also the differences in reasoning and interpretative approaches adopted by Islamic scholars. This study aims to examine the formation and divergence of legal arguments concerning bank interest through the epistemological perspective of Charles Sanders Peirce’s pragmatism. Employing a qualitative library-based research method, this study adopts a philosophical-conceptual approach and descriptive-comparative analysis. The sources include Peirce’s works, Islamic legal literature, religious fatwas, and relevant scholarly publications. The findings indicate that differing views on bank interest can be understood through four key concepts in Peirce’s philosophy: belief, doubt, inquiry, and meaning. Belief explains the formation of legal convictions, doubt reflects questions arising from the application of the prohibition of riba, inquiry represents the examination of legal arguments through scriptural evidence and reasoning, while meaning clarifies the practical implications of different interpretations. These findings suggest that debates over the legal status of bank interest reflect not only divergent legal conclusions but also distinct processes through which legal knowledge is formed and evaluated. This study contributes an epistemological framework for understanding differences in legal reasoning within Islamic economic law without replacing the established sources and methods of Islamic legal interpretation. ]]>
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