Indonesian bureaucratic reform presumes that merit displaces informal ties, yet local civil servants remain embedded in cultural norms and patronage networks. This study examines how local culture, patronage networks, and social embeddedness jointly shape civil servant performance. Drawing on institutional theory, we specify informal institutions as both resources and constraints on bureaucratic behavior. We surveyed 370 civil servants in four local governments in South Sulawesi Province and analyzed the data with partial least squares structural equation modeling. Local culture relates positively to performance, directly and indirectly through social embeddedness. Patronage networks show the strongest positive association with performance, and social embeddedness also predicts performance. Social embeddedness, however, weakens the patronage–performance relationship. The model explains 56.3% of the variance in performance. The findings demonstrate that informal institutions do not simply corrupt merit; they substitute for one another in enabling performance. Public managers should channel embedded relational capital into formal performance systems rather than rely on patronage-based coordination.
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